The Philosophy Discussion Group

[hubert]

If one is to believe the existence of objects outside the mind (which one shouldn't, if one actually followed this method of doubt),

If one was following the method of doubt, one wouldn't believe in the mind, and therefore could not not believe in the existence of objects outside it.

True. But you seem to anyway. By the way, how do you know other people exist?

The first argument (that he hadn't found, in "I think therefore I am", something indubitably true) was the only one being disputed. If you've been disputing some other ones, that could explain a lot of your confusion.

I was disputing the statment "I think, therefore I am," rather than the argument "'I think, therefore I am' is indisputably correct." I'd have to agree with you concerning the latter.

Utterly wrong; the knowledge in the software exists in variations in voltages, and exists in the brain as electrochemical signals - both physical phenomena which, obviously, exist. This isn't open to philosophical discussion; it's the bare fact of the matter. Existence is always a straightforward either/or.

I don't believe knowledge is as straightforward as that. It arises from the physical phenomena, it is not the phenomena itself. What proof do I have for this statement? It's quite simple. Knowledge is a holistic phenomenon. Information only appears when separate elements (each of which holds little or no information of its own) combine to form a whole (and in this case, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts). And if existence is always a straightforward either/or, we wouldn't be having this "argument".

Yes; zero 'exists' as an artificial construct, just like a business does, but that's a different sense of the word 'exist'. That doesn't make existence "a poorly defined concept", it just means it has multiple denotations, like most words.

Same difference.

Is it? You're the one who brought up the method of doubt in the first place. Of course, I have already stated in the beginning of the post the relevance of my scenario (of course it is only relevant to this "method of doubt" stuff, and not to the central discussion).

It is irrelevant, because you still don't understand the method of doubt. Newborn babies don't undergo the method of doubt because they immediately start to accumulate dubitable concepts, which someone in the method of doubt would reject. Amongst these would be the realisation of existence.

But how do they realize it? They start off with a clean slate, yet soon affirm their own existence? Why? How?

Now there's a truly daft definition of existence: "Existence, n. The state enjoyed by things which have an impact on their environment." I've explained why an experience need not have an external experiencer so many times now I will vomit if I do it again, and not once have you refuted it.

You've only proved it by reducing it to something less than it already was. Your argument seems to be that an experience can exist independently of a mind only if it is no longer experienced (i.e. it is stripped of the only thing that made it an experience in the first place.) And can you think of something that exist but which has not impact on its environment?

It does not presuppose the existence of anything. The self comes into existence as soon as it is observed. It cements its existence by observing itself.

This is just an extension of your idealist nonsense.

So it is. But nothing can be proven unless it is observed. You seem to be able to think you can prove things without observing them. Idealism is just a philosophy that dismisses this assumption (because that is all it really is.)

You know, I didn't say *visualise* it. That would be *silly*. When I say 'imagine', I clearly mean 'conceive of'.

Anyone can say something of that sort, but is doesn't mean its real; as soon as one tries to verify its existence, one realizes that it is utterly impossible.

Verifies? He was presupposing it a second ago. Id est, his conclusion is present in his proposition. In other words, it's circular logic. Seems familiar... Oh yes, he's the chappy that said "God is perfect; if God didn't exist he would be less than perfect; therefore God exists." Made a regular habit of it, eh?

I was wrong in saying that this verified his argument (I typed this last part very quickly, and I meant to use another synonym of presuppose. Perhaps "acknowledges" was the word that I was looking for?").

But regarding "I think, therefore I am".... I will try to prove it

1. I think, which means I have an experience.

2. All things that have experiences are conscious. Therefore I am conscious.

3. All things that are conscious exist. Therefore I exist.

I think the only problem is with statement #1. We have already agreed that it is circular reasoning; and the only way to get around this is to interpret the first I differently from the second one. If we treat the second I as the ego, self, (soul?), whatever, and we define the first I as the brain, the statement becomes:

"My brain thinks, therefore I exist." Now I believe the argument will hold water; although I can see someone might have an objection with #3.

[Kinders]

Even I can see the flagrant flaws in some of these arguments, and I don't follow most of what Max is saying:

And if existence is always a straightforward either/or,

..which it must be. Something either exists or it doesn't; how can there be an in between?

we wouldn't be having this "argument".

Why not? Just because there are only two options doesn't mean you can't argue which one is correct...

[hubert]

Something either exists or it doesn't; how can there be an in between?

What about certain sub-atomic particles? It has been proven by quantum physics that observation is needed to "collapse the wave functions" of a particle in order for it to exist. Then there's also virtual particles... Also the existence of the self. According to Max, Descartes's arguments don't hold any water; then how can the self exist? Yet I know I exist.

we wouldn't be having this "argument".

Why not? Just because there are only two options doesn't mean you can't argue which one is correct...

I guess I was concentrating more on the straightforward part than the either/or part.

[Kinders]

What about certain sub-atomic particles? It has been proven by quantum physics that observation is needed to "collapse the wave functions" of a particle in order for it to exist. Then there's also virtual particles... Also the existence of the self. According to Max, Descartes's arguments don't hold any water; then how can the self exist? Yet I know I exist.

Nothing you've said there disagrees with the fact that something either exists or it doesn't. There's still no in between. A virtual particle: assuming that's what it sounds like, it still either exists or it doesn't. You seem to be confusing existence with substance. Something can exist without being material.

As for,

According to Max, Descartes's arguments don't hold any water; then how can the self exist? Yet I know I exist.

First: careful, you're starting to sound religious. And second, I don't believe Max is trying to convince you that you don't exist. I think he's trying to convince you that Descartes' assumptions can't be used as evidence that you exist. I think he's saying "Descartes' theory is flawed," not "Descartes' theory is flawed, therefore all conclusions he comes to through it are incorrect and only the inverse of those conclusions is true".

[hubert]

A virtual particle: assuming that's what it sounds like, it still either exists or it doesn't. You seem to be confusing existence with substance. Something can exist without being material.

According to my admittedly limited understanding of quantum mechanics, virtual particles both exist and do not exist until they are observed, at which time they assume a definite existence. Perhaps there is someone on this forum whose knowledge in this subject matter is greater than mine, and who could back me up on this (or refute me, as the case may be)?

As for the existence/substance thing; that was what I was driving at when I asked Max if numbers and other such things existed. But this is yet another dilemna: what is the benchmark for existence (if there is one)? Personally, I don't think there is any (i.e. I believe everything exists.) I tried to define it differently in my debate with Max as a property that something has when it interacts with its environment (other things), but now I am not so sure.

First: careful, you're starting to sound religious.

I apologize.

And second, I don't believe Max is trying to convince you that you don't exist. I think he's trying to convince you that Descartes' assumptions can't be used as evidence that you exist. I think he's saying "Descartes' theory is flawed," not "Descartes' theory is flawed, therefore all conclusions he comes to through it are incorrect and only the inverse of those conclusions is true".

I don't actually know Max's belief on this subject, but this again creates another new dilemna: how is existence to be proved? Or can it be expected to be proved? Perhaps it is a self-defining phenomena (i.e. those who exist invent the properties of existence to prove their own existence--but now I'm confusing myself). Oh well, I ended up more confused than I started (as is usual when I deal with philosophy).

[hubert]

According to my admittedly limited understanding of quantum mechanics, virtual particles both exist and do not exist until they are observed, at which time they assume a definite existence. Perhaps there is someone on this forum whose knowledge in this subject matter is greater than mine, and who could back me up on this (or refute me, as the case may be)?

Nevermind. I think I was confusing virtual particles with other wave/particle dualistic particles (like photons and gravitons).

I think virtual particles are particles that appear from the void and violate the conservation of energy (but only for a little while, until they disappear again.) Again, I'm not even sure this definition is correct.

[Max]

By the way, how do you know other people exist?

There's a difference between 'know' in the absolute sense and 'know' in the practical sense - I don't know other people exist in the former sense, but do in the latter.

I was disputing the statment "I think, therefore I am," rather than the argument "'I think, therefore I am' is indisputably correct." I'd have to agree with you concerning the latter.

Well, there we are. Glad that's settled. We were talking at cross purposes all along because you misunderstood the claim I was making.

I don't believe knowledge is as straightforward as that. It arises from the physical phenomena, it is not the phenomena itself. What proof do I have for this statement? It's quite simple. Knowledge is a holistic phenomenon. Information only appears when separate elements (each of which holds little or no information of its own) combine to form a whole (and in this case, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts).

That's not proof; that's (mystical) belief. The 'holistic' nature of the phenomenon of knowledge arises from the way physical things interact with the myriad other physical things which make up the knowledge and 'summarise' them into another physical state which encodes the pertinent 'gist' of all those 'bits' of data. You are invoking a mystical notion to explain a complex physical phenomenon now explained by science, just as people have been doing for millennia.

And if existence is always a straightforward either/or, we wouldn't be having this "argument".

It is a straightfoward either/or; we're having this argument because you are, for reasons known only to you, denying this.

Yes; zero 'exists' as an artificial construct, just like a business does, but that's a different sense of the word 'exist'. That doesn't make existence "a poorly defined concept", it just means it has multiple denotations, like most words.

Same difference.

No. It's clearly defined in more than one (clearly distinct) way. This is not the "[s]ame difference" as being "poorly defined"

But how do they realize it? They start off with a clean slate, yet soon affirm their own existence? Why? How?

They don't affirm it, they assume it.

You've only proved it by reducing it to something less than it already was. Your argument seems to be that an experience can exist independently of a mind only if it is no longer experienced (i.e. it is stripped of the only thing that made it an experience in the first place.)

We define things in terms of how they are perceived in the context of the human mind. That isn't how they necessarily are or must be.

And can you think of something that exist but which has not impact on its environment?

Hypothetically; of course.

So it is. But nothing can be proven unless it is observed. You seem to be able to think you can prove things without observing them.

No, because I'm not trying to prove anything - I'm just saying that something might conceivably be.

Idealism is just a philosophy that dismisses this assumption (because that is all it really is.)

No it isn't; idealism makes a false reductio ad absurdum of it by going a step further and saying that because we can't prove something unless we can observe it, it must therefore not exist, when of course, it might, and almost certainly does in most cases.

Anyone can say something of that sort, but is doesn't mean its real; as soon as one tries to verify its existence, one realizes that it is utterly impossible.

Of course it doesn't "mean [sic] its real". It doesn't mean anything in fact. It's just my attempt to get you to realise that something might possibly be; your, or my, conceiving of it, or trying to verify it, has no effect on this.

But regarding "I think, therefore I am".... I will try to prove it

1. I think, which means I have an experience.

2. All things that have experiences are conscious. Therefore I am conscious.

3. All things that are conscious exist. Therefore I exist.

I think the only problem is with statement #1. We have already agreed that it is circular reasoning; and the only way to get around this is to interpret the first I differently from the second one. If we treat the second I as the ego, self, (soul?), whatever, and we define the first I as the brain, the statement becomes:

"My brain thinks, therefore I exist." Now I believe the argument will hold water; although I can see someone might have an objection with #3.

The presupposition of the brain is an even greater one than the presupposition of yourself. You're then presupposing a complex organic object when you haven't even demonstrated that there's such a thing as physical matter!

Even I can see the flagrant flaws in some of these arguments, and I don't follow most of what Max is saying

Are any of these "flagrant flaws" in my argument? I assume not, as you've only quoted Hubert's, but if so I'd very much like to be alerted to them. *Looks doubtful*

And second, I don't believe Max is trying to convince you that you don't exist. I think he's trying to convince you that Descartes' assumptions can't be used as evidence that you exist. I think he's saying "Descartes' theory is flawed," not "Descartes' theory is flawed, therefore all conclusions he comes to through it are incorrect and only the inverse of those conclusions is true".

I don't actually know Max's belief on this subject, but this again creates another new dilemna: how is existence to be proved? Or can it be expected to be proved? Perhaps it is a self-defining phenomena (i.e. those who exist invent the properties of existence to prove their own existence--but now I'm confusing myself). Oh well, I ended up more confused than I started (as is usual when I deal with philosophy).

Firstly, Kinders is correct in his understanding of my argument as stated above. In answer to "how is existence to be proved?" - why need it be? Something doesn't have to be provable to be true. As I have stated already, the only thing we can prove absolutely is that 'An experience exists".

According to my admittedly limited understanding of quantum mechanics, virtual particles both exist and do not exist until they are observed, at which time they assume a definite existence. Perhaps there is someone on this forum whose knowledge in this subject matter is greater than mine, and who could back me up on this (or refute me, as the case may be)?

I'm reasonably knowledgeable on the subject - the idea that there are quantum phenomena that only exist after being observed is a very stubborn misunderstanding arising from the fact that there are some which only settle into a definite state after they are disrupted by some external force, which happens to be a prerequisite of observation, because you have to bounce photons off things to observe them. The things exist before you observe them; they merely haven't settled into one particular 'mode' or existence.

I think virtual particles are particles that appear from the void and violate the conservation of energy (but only for a little while, until they disappear again.) Again, I'm not even sure this definition is correct.

Virtual particles don't violate conservation of energy, because they arise in pairs, one negative and one positive (this is entirely distinct from matter and antimatter; positive and negative particles can both be matter or antimatter), so the overall amount of energy is unaltered. These particles then annihilate each other. The only case in which this does not occur is immediately adjacent to a balck hole, where the negative particle can be drawn into the blackhole before it has a chance to annihilate with its positive counterpart. It is thought that this will lead to the eventual 'evaporation' of blackholes, as the negative particles slowly 'delete' the given blackhole's mass.


______________________



I think we've now just about reached as close a mutual understanding as is desirable. I apologise for being rude before; being contradicted brings out the worst in me...

[Kinders]

Even I can see the flagrant flaws in some of these arguments, and I don't follow most of what Max is saying

Are any of these "flagrant flaws" in my argument? I assume not, as you've only quoted Hubert's, but if so I'd very much like to be alerted to them. *Looks doubtful*

I was talking specifically about something hubert had just said. I still don't understand how I can know/do/feel/etc. anything if I don't exist, but I'm not going to aggrivate any one of us any further by asking you to explain it again. I never expected to say this, but I really don't give a ~*pineapples*~ any more whether I exist or not.

[hubert]

By the way, how do you know other people exist?

There's a difference between 'know' in the absolute sense and 'know' in the practical sense - I don't know other people exist in the former sense, but do in the latter.

So, it's just kind of an educated guess that people exist. (If other people act like you, you believe they exist). In the end, the only thing that you can believe in is yourself (and even that can be subject, as you've demonstrated.)

That's not proof; that's (mystical) belief. The 'holistic' nature of the phenomenon of knowledge arises from the way physical things interact with the myriad other physical things which make up the knowledge and 'summarise' them into another physical state which encodes the pertinent 'gist' of all those 'bits' of data. You are invoking a mystical notion to explain a complex physical phenomenon now explained by science, just as people have been doing for millennia.

But knowledge is not only inherent in the thing being observed, but also in the observer. If an astronaut were to go into space and find a piece of paper that had the word "banana" on it, he would identify it with the familiar yellow fruit/vegetable/herb/whatever it is a banana is classified as. However if a Martian astronaut were to come across the same plaque and read the word, he might indentify it with the word for "balloon" in his native language. In this way, physical things can contain complex and even contradictory information. How can knowledge be a (completely) physical phenomena? It has no physical properties, no shape or size. In fact, knowledge doesn't even have to be conserved like matter/energy does. No consciousness means no knowledge, and the more conscious things are, the more knowledge they have. So where does this knowledge come from? It comes from their physical environment, of coure, but no physical thing is converted into knowledge.

It is a straightfoward either/or; we're having this argument because you are, for reasons known only to you, denying this.

Really? Plato seemed to think that ideas had a definite existence in a world of forms. And wasn't he also the one who believed that shapes did as well? Others believe that numbers also have an existence. Personally, I believe that they exist in the mind. So, does existence in the mind "count" as existence? Is there even such a thing as non-existence, anyway? One could argue that everything at least has an existence in the mind, even if they lack substance.

No. It's clearly defined in more than one (clearly distinct) way. This is not the "[s]ame difference" as being "poorly defined"

What exactly do you mean by existence being defined in multiple ways?

They don't affirm it, they assume it.

Fair enough.

We define things in terms of how they are perceived in the context of the human mind. That isn't how they necessarily are or must be.

How can we ever hope to escape our own minds? How can we know if things can exist or can't exist logically? Logic is based on a series of assumptions, which make sense to us (in the same way that the statement "an experience always needs an experiencer" makes "sense".)

And can you think of something that exist but which has not impact on its environment?

Hypothetically; of course.

Of course.

So it is. But nothing can be proven unless it is observed. You seem to be able to think you can prove things without observing them.

No, because I'm not trying to prove anything - I'm just saying that something might conceivably be.

Something might inconceivably be, perhaps. At least one can state such a thing might occur, if not actually conceive of it.

Idealism is just a philosophy that dismisses this assumption (because that is all it really is.)

No it isn't; idealism makes a false reductio ad absurdum of it by going a step further and saying that because we can't prove something unless we can observe it, it must therefore not exist, when of course, it might, and almost certainly does in most cases.

It is not that things don't exist, it's that they can only be proven to exist inside the mind. And that is all the existence something needs in order to qualify as "in existence". Because things outside the mind may "almost certainly exist" while things inside the mind at least must exist inside the mind.

Anyone can say something of that sort, but is doesn't mean its real; as soon as one tries to verify its existence, one realizes that it is utterly impossible.

Of course it doesn't "mean [sic] its real". It doesn't mean anything in fact. It's just my attempt to get you to realise that something might possibly be; your, or my, conceiving of it, or trying to verify it, has no effect on this.

If it is proven to be possible, then Descartes's argument no longer holds water. As long as such a thing is not proven however, (and it cannot be proven) then Descartes's argument seems a likely proof.

The presupposition of the brain is an even greater one than the presupposition of yourself. You're then presupposing a complex organic object when you haven't even demonstrated that there's such a thing as physical matter!

OK, obviously the method of doubt cannot prove anything (as all systems of logic must be based on some assumptions, while the method of doubt has none.) I must admit, therefore, that in the context of the method of doubt "I think, therefore I am," makes no sense (and I wonder how it may be used to prove any other arguments at all). But it seems to me that the method of doubt coupled with the assumption "an experience requires an experiencer" will be sufficient proof for "I think, therefore I am."

Firstly, Kinders is correct in his understanding of my argument as stated above. In answer to "how is existence to be proved?" - why need it be? Something doesn't have to be provable to be true. As I have stated already, the only thing we can prove absolutely is that 'An experience exists".

"Something doesn't need to be provable to be true." I'll have to agree with you here. Although it makes me wonder.... maybe all we need to do is to prove the experience. A self cannot exist without experiences, and I have postulated that an experience cannot exist without a self (and it cannot, at least in a practical sense), perhaps this is because they are the same thing? Of course, this would require another postulate (I am an experience, or something of the like). But I am getting very sleepy, and this doesn't even make any sense to me, so I will not even attempt to pursue it. I'll have to just agree with you that existence need not (and cannot?) be proven, it must be taken as self-evident (although I never liked that whole "self-evident" thing, it always seemed too useful, too...contrived?).

I'm reasonably knowledgeable on the subject - the idea that there are quantum phenomena that only exist after being observed is a very stubborn misunderstanding arising from the fact that there are some which only settle into a definite state after they are disrupted by some external force, which happens to be a prerequisite of observation, because you have to bounce photons off things to observe them. The things exist before you observe them; they merely haven't settled into one particular 'mode' or existence.

But don't they exist in more than one place at a time? This violates some law of physics, I'm sure of it. (Although I guess this does still count as existence.)

Virtual particles don't violate conservation of energy, because they arise in pairs, one negative and one positive (this is entirely distinct from matter and antimatter; positive and negative particles can both be matter or antimatter), so the overall amount of energy is unaltered. These particles then annihilate each other. The only case in which this does not occur is immediately adjacent to a balck hole, where the negative particle can be drawn into the blackhole before it has a chance to annihilate with its positive counterpart. It is thought that this will lead to the eventual 'evaporation' of blackholes, as the negative particles slowly 'delete' the given blackhole's mass.

I've always liked physics because it's so symmetrical. Positive and negative, matter and anti-matter, supersymmetry (although of course there is that whole unexplained matter-antimatter asymmetry). But the thing about virtual particles is that they don't violate the conservation of charge (because they arise in pairs), but do violate the conservation of energy, becuase since they are particles they have mass and therefore have energy (or something like that).

I think we've now just about reached as close a mutual understanding as is desirable. I apologise for being rude before; being contradicted brings out the worst in me...

Apology accepted. And I also would like to apologize for arguing about something I don't really know anything about (this also applies to the physics stuff as well).

[Max]

But knowledge is not only inherent in the thing being observed, but also in the observer. If an astronaut were to go into space and find a piece of paper that had the word "banana" on it, he would identify it with the familiar yellow fruit/vegetable/herb/whatever it is a banana is classified as. However if a Martian astronaut were to come across the same plaque and read the word, he might indentify it with the word for "balloon" in his native language. In this way, physical things can contain complex and even contradictory information.

I said: "The 'holistic' nature of the phenomenon of knowledge arises from the way physical things interact with the myriad other physical things which make up the knowledge and 'summarise' them into another physical state which encodes the pertinent 'gist' of all those 'bits' of data." The brain references 'bits' of data it receives - ie, the sensory information including the image of the word 'banana' - against other 'bits' stored in its memory to formulate the "pertinent 'gist'" as a neurochemical message. In fact, in this instance, the physical information on the paper is just a trigger for the brain to access the physically stored information associated with that trigger. There's no contradiction; the same trigger simply corresponds with different information in the brains of the human and the Martian.

How can knowledge be a (completely) physical phenomena? It has no physical properties, no shape or size. In fact, knowledge doesn't even have to be conserved like matter/energy does. No consciousness means no knowledge, and the more conscious things are, the more knowledge they have. So where does this knowledge come from? It comes from their physical environment, of coure, but no physical thing is converted into knowledge.

This discussion is exactly analogous with one of 'Life' - an entirely physical phenomenon which seems miraculous, seems to imply something beyond the material but does not in fact do so - except, perhaps, at the point of experience - the experiences had by living things and the experience of knowledge. At the point where knowledge is experienced in the mind, I concede that it becomes something harder to explain away as physical states. But this 'hard problem' of neuroscience in the ultimate stumbling block of all materialistic accounts of reality.

Really? Plato seemed to think that ideas had a definite existence in a world of forms. And wasn't he also the one who believed that shapes did as well? Others believe that numbers also have an existence. Personally, I believe that they exist in the mind. So, does existence in the mind "count" as existence? Is there even such a thing as non-existence, anyway? One could argue that everything at least has an existence in the mind, even if they lack substance.

Plato's world of Forms was pure fantasy, and so are all these other examples. If things in the mind can be said to exist, then they exist in an entirely different sense of the word from things in nature.

What exactly do you mean by existence being defined in multiple ways?

Dictionary.com gives five different denotations of the verb 'exist'. It gives two of the word 'melon'. Single words are applied to multiple distinct things and ideas. Words with only one denotation are, probably, in the minority.

How can we ever hope to escape our own minds? How can we know if things can exist or can't exist logically? Logic is based on a series of assumptions, which make sense to us (in the same way that the statement "an experience always needs an experiencer" makes "sense".)

We can try to minimise the subjectivity which entrapment within our minds veils us with. This is the aim of the method of doubt: to arrive at knowledge unsullied by subjectivity. Descartes failed, because he employed the subjective assumption that 'a thought always needs a thinker' or, "an experience always needs an experiencer". THIS is what I have been trying to say. "I think therefore I am" is NOT what it is still celebrated as: an objective absolute of indubitable knowledge.

It is not that things don't exist, it's that they can only be proven to exist inside the mind. And that is all the existence something needs in order to qualify as "in existence". Because things outside the mind may "almost certainly exist" while things inside the mind at least must exist inside the mind.

But are you saying that the phantasms witnessed by someone in a hallucination exist in a more real way than the physical objects actually around him at the time, because we cannot be sure of those objects existing externally, but we can be sure of those phantasms existing internally?

By the way, what you're describing isn't idealism, which says that external objects do not, in fact, exist at all.

If it is proven to be possible, then Descartes's argument no longer holds water. As long as such a thing is not proven however, (and it cannot be proven) then Descartes's argument seems a likely proof.

I have proven it's possible, as there's no reason whatsoever that an experience could not be a self-enclosed 'thing', 'experiencing itself'.

OK, obviously the method of doubt cannot prove anything (as all systems of logic must be based on some assumptions, while the method of doubt has none.) I must admit, therefore, that in the context of the method of doubt "I think, therefore I am," makes no sense (and I wonder how it may be used to prove any other arguments at all). But it seems to me that the method of doubt coupled with the assumption "an experience requires an experiencer" will be sufficient proof for "I think, therefore I am."

But that assumption is demonstrably false. (Despite the trouble I've encountered in getting you and Kinders to comprehend that demonstration.)

"Something doesn't need to be provable to be true." I'll have to agree with you here. Although it makes me wonder.... maybe all we need to do is to prove the experience. A self cannot exist without experiences, and I have postulated that an experience cannot exist without a self (and it cannot, at least in a practical sense), perhaps this is because they are the same thing? Of course, this would require another postulate (I am an experience, or something of the like). But I am getting very sleepy, and this doesn't even make any sense to me, so I will not even attempt to pursue it. I'll have to just agree with you that existence need not (and cannot?) be proven, it must be taken as self-evident (although I never liked that whole "self-evident" thing, it always seemed too useful, too...contrived?).

I rather like the idea of defining the 'self' - a rather vague concept I've always had trouble pinning down - as being 'an experience', ie, the one I begin to have as soon as my brain attains a certain complexity in the womb, and cease to have when I die. The interruptions of dreamless sleep and unconsciousness are perfectly compatible with this, because in those instances you lose your 'selfhood' for the duration. This solves the problem of defining when a foetus begins to live a life of its own in the womb, and indeed, what a 'higher' living organism is: an organic structure that has experiences.

I have had this idea previously without formulating it in exactly this way: just the other night I was discussing how all morality can be based on the idea that the difference between being alive and being dead is that in the former case you have experiences, and in the latter you do not (and therefore, as we have evidently chosen to be alive (because we have not killed ourselves) experiences must have value - and thereby, value is present even in a material universe and 'morality' can be justified). Thus, you 'are', as a living self, the experience you are having in a given moment.

But don't they exist in more than one place at a time? This violates some law of physics, I'm sure of it.

It violates the law that nothing may exceed the speed of light, because spacially separate phenomena (in fact a single phenomenom) interact without any time delay when they are forced by an external interaction to 'settle down' in one point in spacetime - because how does the one in the location not 'chosen' know to cease to be there? Very peculiar. It suggests an ultimately metaspatial basis for energy, before it 'takes up residence' firmly in our universe by becoming a physical particle.

I've always liked physics because it's so symmetrical. Positive and negative, matter and anti-matter, supersymmetry (although of course there is that whole unexplained matter-antimatter asymmetry). But the thing about virtual particles is that they don't violate the conservation of charge (because they arise in pairs), but do violate the conservation of energy, becuase since they are particles they have mass and therefore have energy (or something like that).

No no, that's the point, negative particles have negative mass and therefore negative energy. That's why I used the illustration of the blackhole's mass being depleted. Negative particles of mass -1g would, upon coming into contact with positive particles of mass 1g, cause all the particles concerned to disappear completely - as distinct from matter-antimatter annihilation, when the sum of the energy of the particles annihilated is released. So there is no violation of conservation of energy, there can be no violation of conservation of energy. See?

[hubert]

But knowledge is not only inherent in the thing being observed, but also in the observer. If an astronaut were to go into space and find a piece of paper that had the word "banana" on it, he would identify it with the familiar yellow fruit/vegetable/herb/whatever it is a banana is classified as. However if a Martian astronaut were to come across the same plaque and read the word, he might indentify it with the word for "balloon" in his native language. In this way, physical things can contain complex and even contradictory information.

I said: "The 'holistic' nature of the phenomenon of knowledge arises from the way physical things interact with the myriad other physical things which make up the knowledge and 'summarise' them into another physical state which encodes the pertinent 'gist' of all those 'bits' of data." The brain references 'bits' of data it receives - ie, the sensory information including the image of the word 'banana' - against other 'bits' stored in its memory to formulate the "pertinent 'gist'" as a neurochemical message. In fact, in this instance, the physical information on the paper is just a trigger for the brain to access the physically stored information associated with that trigger. There's no contradiction; the same trigger simply corresponds with different information in the brains of the human and the Martian.

You said "The 'holistic' nature of the phenomenon of knowledge arises from the way physical things interact with the myriad other physical things which make up the knowledge and 'summarise' them into another physical state which encodes the pertinent 'gist' of all those 'bits' of data." I completely agree. I'm not declaring that knowledge arises from "divine source," or something. I agree that it arises from physical interactions. The point of contention is: does it have a physical existence?

It cannot be quantified, and appears out of nowhere. At the beginning of the universe, there was no knowledge at all. Now there is. This is completely unlike matter which is remains constant all the time, and which can only change form.

How can knowledge be a (completely) physical phenomena? It has no physical properties, no shape or size. In fact, knowledge doesn't even have to be conserved like matter/energy does. No consciousness means no knowledge, and the more conscious things are, the more knowledge they have. So where does this knowledge come from? It comes from their physical environment, of coure, but no physical thing is converted into knowledge.

This discussion is exactly analogous with one of 'Life' - an entirely physical phenomenon which seems miraculous, seems to imply something beyond the material but does not in fact do so - except, perhaps, at the point of experience - the experiences had by living things and the experience of knowledge. At the point where knowledge is experienced in the mind, I concede that it becomes something harder to explain away as physical states. But this 'hard problem' of neuroscience in the ultimate stumbling block of all materialistic accounts of reality.

Well, if life is defined as the existence of a self (which could obviously be argued--a paramecium has life, does it recognize a self-entity?), then one could say this is just the discussion we were having earlier. As for it being "the ultimate stumbling block of all materialistic accounts of reality", why do you think I'm an idealist?

Really? Plato seemed to think that ideas had a definite existence in a world of forms. And wasn't he also the one who believed that shapes did as well? Others believe that numbers also have an existence. Personally, I believe that they exist in the mind. So, does existence in the mind "count" as existence? Is there even such a thing as non-existence, anyway? One could argue that everything at least has an existence in the mind, even if they lack substance.

Plato's world of Forms was pure fantasy, and so are all these other examples. If things in the mind can be said to exist, then they exist in an entirely different sense of the word from things in nature.

Exactly. But now you're saying that existence in the mind is different from existence in nature? But isn't the mind a natural phenomenon? Unless of course you're proposing a mind-body duality? In any case, it is not as clear-cut as it appears. And you still haven't given me a good definition of existence (not that I expect one; as I have said earlier, it is an intuitively understood concept).

What exactly do you mean by existence being defined in multiple ways?

Dictionary.com gives five different denotations of the verb 'exist'. It gives two of the word 'melon'. Single words are applied to multiple distinct things and ideas. Words with only one denotation are, probably, in the minority.

Oddly enough....

1. The fact or state of existing; being.
2. The fact or state of continued being; life: our brief existence on Earth.
3.

1. All that exists: sang the beauty of all existence.
2. A thing that exists; an entity.

4. A mode or manner of existing: scratched out a meager existence.
5. Specific presence; occurrence:

Three of the definitions use the word "exist". You can't define a word with itself (even if you define a noun with its own verb). Definition number two uses "being" and "life"; in this context they are just synonyms of existence. So the only one left in definition number five: "Specific presence, occurence." Do I as (as in my mind, not body--although in the end they are the same thing) have a "specific presence, occurence"? At best, it's debatable.

Not that a dictionary makes any sense anyway; in order to use it, you would have to define every word in a definition, then define every word in these definitions, and so on ad infinitum. It is an exampe of "circular defining" and it depends entirely upon certain "words" that are taken to be understood. If you replace words with axioms, it's analogous to logical philosophy.

Of course, this is just if we are reading the dictionary with something akin to the method of doubt. In reality we already know the definitions of most of the words. This is because word definitions don't really matter, they are mere approximations of intuitively understood concepts (like that net analogy you used earlier).

How can we ever hope to escape our own minds? How can we know if things can exist or can't exist logically? Logic is based on a series of assumptions, which make sense to us (in the same way that the statement "an experience always needs an experiencer" makes "sense".)

We can try to minimise the subjectivity which entrapment within our minds veils us with. This is the aim of the method of doubt: to arrive at knowledge unsullied by subjectivity. Descartes failed, because he employed the subjective assumption that 'a thought always needs a thinker' or, "an experience always needs an experiencer". THIS is what I have been trying to say. "I think therefore I am" is NOT what it is still celebrated as: an objective absolute of indubitable knowledge.

Calm down, I'm just agreeing with you (and proposing a set of philosophical questions that I wish I had the answers to--if there are any, that is).

It is not that things don't exist, it's that they can only be proven to exist inside the mind. And that is all the existence something needs in order to qualify as "in existence". Because things outside the mind may "almost certainly exist" while things inside the mind at least must exist inside the mind.

But are you saying that the phantasms witnessed by someone in a hallucination exist in a more real way than the physical objects actually around him at the time, because we cannot be sure of those objects existing externally, but we can be sure of those phantasms existing internally?

Yes, I guess this is what I'm saying. The mind is the source of all existence (name one thing that can be known to exist without you observing it with your mind through your senses). Although they don't exist in a "more real way", they rather have a more defined existence. And how are you to know you aren't that "someone in a hallucination" right now? Rather than trying to determine if something exists or not, why don't you just "dodge the bullet" altogether and redefine existence as the state of things which is being experienced right now?

By the way, what you're describing isn't idealism, which says that external objects do not, in fact, exist at all.

I like to stay away from absolutes (only the Sith deal in absolutes, you know--I wonder if you'll get the reference). Absolute "no" is just as foolish as absolute "yes", in my opinion. If that is what an idealist is, then I'll have to relinquish my label.

If it is proven to be possible, then Descartes's argument no longer holds water. As long as such a thing is not proven however, (and it cannot be proven) then Descartes's argument seems a likely proof.

I have proven it's possible, as there's no reason whatsoever that an experience could not be a self-enclosed 'thing', 'experiencing itself'.

Ah, yes... Kant's thing-in-itself. This is a difference between us that I don't believe is going to be solved anytime soon. Anyway, I'll rephrase my argument: "If it is proven to exist, then Descartes's argument no longer holds water." I think we have slightly different definitions of the word "possible".

OK, obviously the method of doubt cannot prove anything (as all systems of logic must be based on some assumptions, while the method of doubt has none.) I must admit, therefore, that in the context of the method of doubt "I think, therefore I am," makes no sense (and I wonder how it may be used to prove any other arguments at all. But it seems to me that the method of doubt coupled with the assumption "an experience requires an experiencer" will be sufficient proof for "I think, therefore I am."

But that assumption is demonstrably false. (Despite the trouble I've encountered in getting you and Kinders to comprehend that demonstration.)

Maybe it is, maybe it isn't. I honestly don't believe it. In any case, the statement "an experience needs an experiencer" seems just as sound to me as any other axiom of logic.

"Something doesn't need to be provable to be true." I'll have to agree with you here. Although it makes me wonder.... maybe all we need to do is to prove the experience. A self cannot exist without experiences, and I have postulated that an experience cannot exist without a self (and it cannot, at least in a practical sense), perhaps this is because they are the same thing? Of course, this would require another postulate (I am an experience, or something of the like). But I am getting very sleepy, and this doesn't even make any sense to me, so I will not even attempt to pursue it. I'll have to just agree with you that existence need not (and cannot?) be proven, it must be taken as self-evident (although I never liked that whole "self-evident" thing, it always seemed too useful, too...contrived?).

I rather like the idea of defining the 'self' - a rather vague concept I've always had trouble pinning down - as being 'an experience', ie, the one I begin to have as soon as my brain attains a certain complexity in the womb, and cease to have when I die. The interruptions of dreamless sleep and unconsciousness are perfectly compatible with this, because in those instances you lose your 'selfhood' for the duration. This solves the problem of defining when a foetus begins to live a life of its own in the womb, and indeed, what a 'higher' living organism is: an organic structure that has experiences.

I have had this idea previously without formulating it in exactly this way: just the other night I was discussing how all morality can be based on the idea that the difference between being alive and being dead is that in the former case you have experiences, and in the latter you do not (and therefore, as we have evidently chosen to be alive (because we have not killed ourselves) experiences must have value - and thereby, value is present even in a material universe and 'morality' can be justified). Thus, you 'are', as a living self, the experience you are having in a given moment.

But do we choose to exist? We are "programmed" to want to exist by evolution. Only those who want to exist survive to reproduce. Free will must be proven first, and I'd like to see someone who can do that, as science seems to favor determinism (or, at best "randomism".)

But don't they exist in more than one place at a time? This violates some law of physics, I'm sure of it.

It violates the law that nothing may exceed the speed of light, because spacially separate phenomena (in fact a single phenomenom) interact without any time delay when they are forced by an external interaction to 'settle down' in one point in spacetime - because how does the one in the location not 'chosen' know to cease to be there? Very peculiar. It suggests an ultimately metaspatial basis for energy, before it 'takes up residence' firmly in our universe by becoming a physical particle.

I think I've heard something like this before...something about how if a particle releases two other particles any change to one of the two will affect the other. Perhaps all this suggests is a different definition of the word "particle". Kind of like how non-Euclidean geometry was based on different definitions for points and lines.

I've always liked physics because it's so symmetrical. Positive and negative, matter and anti-matter, supersymmetry (although of course there is that whole unexplained matter-antimatter asymmetry). But the thing about virtual particles is that they don't violate the conservation of charge (because they arise in pairs), but do violate the conservation of energy, becuase since they are particles they have mass and therefore have energy (or something like that).

No no, that's the point, negative particles have negative mass and therefore negative energy. That's why I used the illustration of the blackhole's mass being depleted. Negative particles of mass -1g would, upon coming into contact with positive particles of mass 1g, cause all the particles concerned to disappear completely - as distinct from matter-antimatter annihilation, when the sum of the energy of the particles annihilated is released. So there is no violation of conservation of energy, there can be no violation of conservation of energy. See?

Indeed I do. But how can something have negative mass? Does it repel things with anti-gravity instead of attract them? I thought only dark energy exhibited this property. It's very interesting, these opposites. A proton is the opposite of an electon, but both are matter. Matter is the opposite of antimatter, but both have mass (and I think are both fermions). And fermions are the opposite of bosons.... Could there be particles that exist in negative dimensions, then?[/quote]

[Huginn]

Since I may not know philosophy but definitely do know physics...

What we're talking about are pairs of particles spontaneously created in the vacuum of space. Since the net energy of this region of space must be zero, it stands to reason that one of these particles has positive mass, the other negative. Since positive mass exerts a force that attracts other positive mass, negative mass exerts a force that repels positive mass (again, so the next gravitational force is zero). To try to use the concept of opposites is an oversimplification of physics: protons and elections have opposite electric charges. Corresponding particles of matter and antimatter have both opposite electric charges and spins. However, this does not make protons and electrons "opposites" (one of them is many orders of magnitude heavier than the other), nor does it make matter and antimatter opposites (since when they annihilate, they produce gamma rays, indicating that they share one thing in common: positive mass and energy).

Finally, the only difference between fermions and bosons, in terms of particle physics, is that the former obey the Pauli exclusion principle (that two cannot possess the same quantum state), while the latter do not.

[hubert]

So, Huginn, I've got to ask--is there a Munin as well? One isn't much good without the other, you know

What we're talking about are pairs of particles spontaneously created in the vacuum of space. Since the net energy of this region of space must be zero, it stands to reason that one of these particles has positive mass, the other negative. Since positive mass exerts a force that attracts other positive mass, negative mass exerts a force that repels positive mass (again, so the next gravitational force is zero). To try to use the concept of opposites is an oversimplification of physics: protons and elections have opposite electric charges. Corresponding particles of matter and antimatter have both opposite electric charges and spins. However, this does not make protons and electrons "opposites" (one of them is many orders of magnitude heavier than the other), nor does it make matter and antimatter opposites (since when they annihilate, they produce gamma rays, indicating that they share one thing in common: positive mass and energy).

Thanks for clarifying that. I guess Max was right. But, back with the whole "opposites" thing--what I was wondering was: is it possible for negative dimensions to exist? There are already fractal dimensions, why not negative ones as well?

Finally, the only difference between fermions and bosons, in terms of particle physics, is that the former obey the Pauli exclusion principle (that two cannot possess the same quantum state), while the latter do not.

But aren't fermions particles of matter and aren't bosons particles of forces/energy?

All this physics stuff is really quite interesting. Someone should start a thread on it sometime.

[Huginn]

There is indeed. If I had a dæmon, that would be her. Get it?

Fractional dimensions (fractals) exist as a mathematical construct, not necessarily as physical fact. The latter applies, at least, to negative dimensions.

As for bosons, you refer to gauge bosons, which are force carriers like photons, gravitons, etc. However, most atomic nuclei are bosons, too.

[Max]

I don't understand your argument. Having thoughts without something to think them is like having peanut butter without any peanuts.

(in fact, I would much rather have a discussion about someone like Nietzsche)

16

There are still some harmless self-scrutinizers who think that there are 'immediate certainties', as for example, 'I think' ... the philosopher must say to himself, 'If I analyse the process expressed by the proposition "I think", I get a series of audacious assertions that would be difficult if not impossible to prove; for example, that I am the one who is thinking, that there has to be a something doing the thinking, that thinking is an activity and an effect on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that an "I" exists, and finally, that we by now understand clearly what is designated as thinking - that I know what thinking is. For if I had not already decided it for myself, how could I determine what is going on is not "willing" or "feeling"? In short, saying "I think" assumes that I am comparing my present state with other states that I experience in myself, thereby establishing what it is: because of this reference back to another "knowledge", there is, for me at least, no immediate "certainty" here.'

Thus, instead of that 'immediate certainty' that the common people may believe in, the philosopher gets handed a series of metaphysical questions: these are actually the intellect's questions of conscience, such as, 'Where does my concept of thinking come from? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the right to talk about an "I", and beyond that an "I as cause", and beyond that an "I as the case of thoughts"?' Anyone who dares to answer such metaphysical questions promptly by referring to some kind of epistemological intuition (like someone who says, 'I think, and know that this at least is true, real, and certain') will be met with a smile and two question marks by the philosopher of today. 'My dear sir,' the philosopher may suggest, 'it is improbable that you are not in error, but then why must we insist on truth?'

17

As regards the superstitions of logicians, I never tire of underlining a quick little fact that these superstitious people are reluctant to admit: namely, that a thought comes when 'it' wants to, and not when 'I' want it to; so it is falsifying the facts to say that the subject 'I' is the condition of the predicate 'think'. There is thinking [literally translated from the German: 'it thinks'], but to assert that 'there' is the same thing as the famous old 'I' is, to put it mildly, only an assumption, an hypothesis, and certainly not an 'immediate certainty'. And in the end 'there is thinking' is also going too far: even this 'there' contains an interpretation of the process and is not part of the process itself. People are concluding here according to grammatical habit: 'Thinking is an activity; for each activity there is someone who acts; therefore- [I am].'

I said all that throughout my argument, but perhaps if I'd been able to put it with such clarity and concision it would have been over much sooner and more conclusively.

[hubert]

I just finished reading Meditations, and finding myself somewhat more well-versed on the subject, I think I have somewhat more to add. If we are to interpret the statement as "It thinks, it exists." (The it being the "I" that cannot be viewed as such in the method of doubt), Descartes's proof is sufficient as long as it is coupled with the assumption that a thinking thing is needed for thinking to occur. In fact, this is exactly what he does:

To think? That's it. It is thought. This alone cannot be detached from me. I am, I exist; that is certain. But for how long? As long as I think, for it might possibly happen if I ceased completely to think that I would thereby cease to exist at all

What he is doing, essentially is identifying himself with the action of thinking (which is what I proposed earlier). The only problem is that he believes a thought is different from a thinker (this being, of course, the grammatical tradition that Nietzsche so disliked.)

So, in short I would have to conclude that thought can be sufficient proof of... thought. So, I guess I'm agreeing with you that "I think, therefore I am" is faulty, but only because the "I" that he proves is not the same "I" that is generally understood.

However, I'd also like to clarify my position on idealism. I am afraid that I (not being well acquainted with philosophical terminology) was a little confused on this matter. The philosophy that I identify with the most is really solipism. I thought that the philosophy of idealism could help to avoid the central problem of solipism (that nothing outside the self could be known to exist) by saying that it didn't need to. The thing that really bothers me is what you said earlier about things outside the mind "most likely existing" (I'm paraphrasing here). I don't believe that even that much can be assumed. If we are to take all the infinite things that could be true, and compared them to this "reality", we will find that the probability of this reality existing is 0%.

By, the way how do you like Beyond Good and Evil? I found it to be a most interesting read.

I almost must comment on your new avatar. Not only is it very nice, I also admit I find myself in absolute agreement with the sentiment expressed there.

[Max]

So, in short I would have to conclude that thought can be sufficient proof of... thought. So, I guess I'm agreeing with you that "I think, therefore I am" is faulty, but only because the "I" that he proves is not the same "I" that is generally understood.

This "I" Descartes has allegedly proved is the 'there' Nietzsche discusses: I am with him in believing that we should:

get used to doing without that little 'there' (into which the honest old 'I' has evaporated).

However, I'd also like to clarify my position on idealism. I am afraid that I (not being well acquainted with philosophical terminology) was a little confused on this matter. The philosophy that I identify with the most is really solipism. I thought that the philosophy of idealism could help to avoid the central problem of solipism (that nothing outside the self could be known to exist) by saying that it didn't need to.

That doesn't avoid the problem: it creates the problem. There's no logical problem with nothing beyond the self being ultimately 'knowable' - but a whole Pandora's box of problems is unleashed when people start to imagine that there is in fact nothing beyond the self to know. (Solipsism, incidentally.)

The thing that really bothers me is what you said earlier about things outside the mind "most likely existing" (I'm paraphrasing here). I don't believe that even that much can be assumed. If we are to take all the infinite things that could be true, and compared them to this "reality", we will find that the probability of this reality existing is 0%.

No. Nothing and Everything (capitalised because I'm using the words in an absolute sense) are two sides of one coin. As we know there is Something - if only this 'experience' we have demonstrated with certainty - we know also that that coin must be 'Everything' side up. Everything and Nothing obviously cannot coexist because the latter precludes the former, and you cannot just have 'Something' - that Something would then be Everything. Therefore - and this is a more abstract logical leap, I admit - "all the infinite things" that could be, must be, for their 'not being' is a degree of Nothingness, which, as demonstrated initially, constitutes a clear contradiction of Everything. To put it another way - and this bit must be read carefully - there can be no limit on Everything, because limits require, incompatibly, some Nothing to do the limiting: any other limit would be another Something, in turn limited Something else, and that by another, and so on until Everything possible exists if only as the 'limitation' of another Thing! (This is why we think of things as finite: because they are one fence amidst an infinity of fences.)

Therefore, the probability of this reality existing is, in fact, 100% - because all potential realities must exist somewhere, somehow. Anything else is a logical absurdity, even if it seems even more absurd to suggest that at this very moment, somewhere in all reality, Balthamos is killing Father Gomez.

I get the impression that I'm playing with words there - I mean, I've sneaked in the assumption that 'Nothing and Everything' must have real implications as 'absolutes': I feel that they must, but I can't quite justify why, so I suppose it's just an "epistemological intuition". At any rate, "All the infinite things that could be true, must be true, so the probability of this "reality" existing is 100%" is far more plausible than the ridiculous "If we are to take all the infinite things that could be true, and compared them to [sic] this "reality", we will find that the probability of this reality existing is 0%."

[hubert]

So, in short I would have to conclude that thought can be sufficient proof of... thought. So, I guess I'm agreeing with you that "I think, therefore I am" is faulty, but only because the "I" that he proves is not the same "I" that is generally understood.

This "I" Descartes has allegedly proved is the 'there' Nietzsche discusses: I am with him in believing that we should:

get used to doing without that little 'there' (into which the honest old 'I' has evaporated).

What I was trying to say is that Descartes proves the self as a thinking thing only. This "thinking thing" is exactly equivalent to thought. So, he begins with "there is thought" and ends with "there is thought." However, when he refers to this "I" (that he proves only as a thinking thing) later, he gives it all sorts of attributes like free will, the capability for emotion, et cetera (although he proved it only as something that thinks).

That doesn't avoid the problem: it creates the problem. There's no logical problem with nothing beyond the self being ultimately 'knowable' - but a whole Pandora's box of problems is unleashed when people start to imagine that there is in fact nothing beyond the self to know.

It's not that there is nothing beyond the self to know, it's simply that there is nothing that can be known to have an existence independent of an observer. "If a tree falls in the middle of the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound?"

(Solipsism, incidentally.)

I have nothing to blame but my own stupidity for this. Not even the ol' "typo excuse" will suffice here.

No. Nothing and Everything (capitalised because I'm using the words in an absolute sense) are two sides of one coin. As we know there is Something - if only this 'experience' we have demonstrated with certainty - we know also that that coin must be 'Everything' side up. Everything and Nothing obviously cannot coexist because the latter precludes the former, and you cannot just have 'Something' - that Something would then be Everything. Therefore - and this is a more abstract logical leap, I admit - "all the infinite things" that could be, must be, for their 'not being' is a degree of Nothingness, which, as demonstrated initially, constitutes a clear contradiction of Everything. To put it another way - and this bit must be read carefully - there can be no limit on Everything, because limits require, incompatibly, some Nothing to do the limiting: any other limit would be another Something, in turn limited Something else, and that by another, and so on until Everything possible exists if only as the 'limitation' of another Thing! (This is why we think of things as finite: because they are one fence amidst an infinity of fences.)

So... the same Max who denied the existence of numbers and such now believes in the existence of everything? And you're arguing that non-existence is impossible because everything that is defined has some properties and therefore exists in some manner? This bears striking resemblance to my own thoughts on the subject. But I must argue that an infinity of possible things is not equivalent to all possible things.

Therefore, the probability of this reality existing is, in fact, 100% - because all potential realities must exist somewhere, somehow. Anything else is a logical absurdity, even if it seems even more absurd to suggest that at this very moment, somewhere in all reality, Balthamos is killing Father Gomez.

Wait a second.... you accused me of being Pandora? In a single swipe you've just destroyed all justification for ethical behavior as well as annihilating any chance for free will. Unfortunately, I can't disagree with you.

But you state "the probability of this reality existing is, in fact, 100% - because all potential realities must exist somewhere, somehow." So, I ask you: "Where is this reality, this world, known to exist 100%?" The answer, of course, is inside the mind.

At any rate, "All the infinite things that could be true, must be true, so the probability of this "reality" existing is 100%" is far more plausible than the ridiculous "If we are to take all the infinite things that could be true, and compared them to [sic] this "reality", we will find that the probability of this reality existing is 0%."

Maybe, but it creates its own share of problems (in fact, a lot more than it solves).